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FORCES AND MECHANISMS IN
THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS
JON ELSTERt
INTRODUCTION

The topic of this Essay is how new constitutions are made,
the mechanics of constitution-making. Surprisingly, there is no
body of literature that deals with the constitution-making process
in a positive, explanatory perspective. There are, to be sure, a
number of studies, on which I shall draw heavily, of particular
constitution-making episodes. Furthermore, there is a large comparative and theoretical literature on the ordinary legislative process, as well as a substantial body of writings on comparative constitutional law. Much has also been written on the consequences of

constitutional design-presidential versus parliamentary systems,
unicameralism versus bicameralism, and so on. But there is not, to
my knowledge, a single book or even article that considers the
process of constitution-making, in its full generality, as a distinctive
object of positive analysis.' Although the present Essay is by ne-

"t Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University. This Essay
was presented as the 1995 Brainerd Currie Lecture at the Duke University School of
Law on February 13, 1995. Over the last five years I have discussed constitution-making
in Eastern Europe and elsewhere with a number of colleagues. I am especially grateful
to Stephen Holmes, Aanund Hylland, Claus Offe, Wiktor Osiatynski, Ulrich Preuss, Adam Przeworski, and Cass Sunstein. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the
IRIS project and of the Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe at
the University of Chicago Law School.
1. Among writers who have considered constitution-making in comparative perspective, MARKKU SUKSI, MAKING A CONSTITUTION: THE OUTLINE OF AN ARGUMENT
(1995) is mainly legal and normative. A more explanatory approach is found in chapter 8
of ANDREA BONIME-BLANC, SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE POLrICS OF

CONSTITUTION-MAKING 135-61 (1987), but her discussion is less than fully general. Being
limited to transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, it does not, for instance, cover
such constitution-making episodes as the Federal Convention in Philadelphia. The articles
in CONSTITUTION MAKERS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1988) describe individual constitution-making episodes, with no comparative or
theoretical perspectives, except for the fact that the contributors were asked to address
the same set of questions. PATRICK A. FAFARD & DARREL R. REID, CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLIES: A COMPARATIvE SURVEY (1991), while useful, is mainly descriptive (and,
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cessity somewhat sketchy, it takes a few steps towards remedying
that deficiency.
Another noteworthy gap in the literature is the absence of
normative discussions of the constitution-making process. Towards
the end of this Essay, I briefly address the issue of the optimal
design of the constitution-making process, an issue that is both
separate from and indirectly related to the issue of designing the
optimal constitution.
Creating a constitution involves making choices under constraints. In most of the cases that concern me, these are collective
choices-the work of a constituent assembly rather than of a single legislator like Solon. We must consider, therefore, both the
goals of individual constitution-makers and the mechanisms by
which these are aggregated into collective choices. These are the
key notions in the Essay: constraints, individual motivations, and
systems of aggregation. I shall also consider the cognitive assumptions of the constitution-makers-their beliefs about what institutional arrangements will bring about which results. These beliefs
form the bridge between overall goals and preferences for specific
constitutional provisions.
Constitutions can be written or unwritten. Some countries that
do have a written constitution also operate through unwritten
"constitutional conventions."' In the United States, for instance,
the independence of the central bank (i.e., the Federal Reserve
Board) is not explicitly stated in the constitution, as it is in some
other countries. Yet, de facto the Board enjoys considerable autonomy because of a constitutional convention by virtue of which
any attempt by the executive or the legislature to interfere with its
activities would incur costly political sanctions. Other countries,
notably Britain, rely exclusively on constitutional conventions. In
this Essay, I am concerned exclusively with the making of written
constitutions. The emergence of unwritten conventions is subject to
causal mechanisms that remain poorly understood and that are in
any case very different from the (mainly) collective deliberations
that are the topic of the present Essay.3 From now on, then, the

to some extent, prescriptive).
2.

GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 9 (1984).

3. For some attempts to explain the emergence of conventions, see JAMES S.
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS

OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990); JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF

SOCIETY (1989); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); ANDREW SCHOTTER,
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term "constitution" will always refer to a written document.
If we want to distinguish the constitution from other legal
texts, three criteria offer themselves. First, many countries have a
set of laws collectively referred to as "the constitution." Second,
some laws may be deemed "constitutional" because they regulate
matters that are in some sense more fundamental than others.
And third, the constitution may be distinguished from ordinary
legislation by more stringent amendment procedures. These characterizations, however, do not always yield the same results.
New Zealand has a constitution according to the first and
second criteria, but not according to the third. In that country,
"only ordinary legislative efforts are required to supplement, modify or repeal the Constitution."4
Conversely, Israel has a constitution according to the second
and third criteria, but not according to the first. After 1948, there
was no agreement on the need for a constitution. Whereas some
"stressed the stabilizing effect of a constitution, which is particularly necessary in a dynamic and volatile population," 5 others
"stressed the dangers of a rigid constitution, and the likely calamities ensuing from a reactionary supreme court with powers of
judicial review, particularly in a dynamic society.",6 Although the

latter view prevailed, the Knesset since 1950 has adopted a number of basic laws that satisfy the second and third criteria. They
regulate basic matters such as the Knesset itself, Israel Lands, the
state president, the government, the state economy, the army, Jerusalem, capital of Israel, and the judiciary. Most of these laws
contain a provision that they cannot be modified during a state of
emergency, thus also satisfying the third criterion. In addition, the
law on the Knesset is entrenched in the sense of requiring an
absolute majority for its amendment.

THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1981); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE (1986); MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY
AND COOPERATION (1976); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMs

(1977).
4. Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 394 n.61. Eule goes on to say, however,
that "[e]ven in such a system ... there remain moral and political restraints on the
legislative alteration of constitutional doctrine." Id.In other words, satisfaction of the first
criterion may to some extent automatically ensure satisfaction of the third.
5. Emanuel Gutmann, Israel Democracy Without a Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONS
IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 290, 292 (Vernon Bogdanov ed., 1988).
6. Id.at 295.
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Some countries have a body of "organic laws" that, although
not part of the document referred to as "the constitution," require
a supermajority for their amendment. In France, the requirement
is that of an absolute majority; in Hungary, it is two-thirds.
Some aspects ,of political life that we tend to think of as fundamental are not regulated by the constitution or not by all constitutions; nor are the laws regulating them always subject to more
stringent amendment procedures. The most important example is
provided by laws governing elections to parliament. Some constitutions specify the electoral system in some detail; others (Poland,
the Czech Republic) only in general outlines; and some (France,
Hungary) not at all. In Hungary, but not in France, electoral laws
are "organic" in the sense indicated above. The status of the central bank is similarly omitted from most constitutions or mentioned only in general terms. An exception is the Czech constitution, which explicitly forbids the government from instructing the
bank. Even more striking is the absence from all constitutions
(known to me) of constitutional provisions ensuring the independence of the state-owned media.
The main explanandum in this Essay is the adoption of a
document called "the constitution." In practice, this document will
also satisfy the second criterion. All constitutions regulate fundamental matters, although not only such matters nor all such matters. With the exception of New Zealand, it will also satisfy the
third criterion. Because of the fundamental importance of electoral
laws in regulating political life, I shall often treat them on a par
with constitutional provisions proper. This practice seems especially justified in the cases where the inclusion or noninclusion of
electoral laws in the constitution was a matter of debate in the
constitution-making process, as was the case, for instance, in the
making of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic.7 I shall
also include in the explanandum the quasi-constitutional Round
Table Talks that took place in several East European countries in
1989 and 1990. The Polish talks, in particular, very explicitly took
the form of constitutional bargaining. s

7.

ALAIN PEYREFITrE, C'trArr DE GAULLE 452 (1994).

8. For a survey of these events, see Jon Elster, Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, 71 PUB. ADMIN. 169 (1993).
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WAVES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING

Let me begin by describing my universe. For reasons that I
shall discuss later, constitution-making tends to occur in waves.
From the late eighteenth century to the present, one can identify
at least seven such waves.
Modem constitution-making began in the late eighteenth
century. Between 1780 and 1791, constitutions were written for the
9
various American states, the United States, Poland, and France.
The next wave occurred in the wake of the 1848 revolutions
in Europe. ° Counting all the small German and Italian states,
revolutions took place in more than fifty countries. Many of these
also adopted new constitutions-often replaced within a short
period by constitutions imposed by the victorious counterrevolutionary forces.
A third wave broke out after the First World War. The newly
created or recreated states of Poland and Czechoslovakia wrote

9. Of these, I shall consider only the Federal Convention of 1787 and the French
Assemb]6e Constituante of 1789-1791. Concerning the latter, I have benefited especially
from JEAN EGRET, LA RiEVOLUTION DES NOTABLES (1950) and JEAN EGRET, NECKER,
MINESTRE DE LOUIS XVI (1975). Transcripts of the debates are found in ARCHIVES
PARLEMENTAIRES DE 1787 A 1860 PREMIkRE StRIE (1789 A 1799) (1875-1888) [hereinafter ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES], to be supplemented by 1 ORATEURS DE LA
REVOLUTION FRANCAISE: LES CONSTITUANTS (Frangois Furet & Ran Hal6vi eds., 1989).
For the American debates and their background, I have mainly consulted CALVIN C.
JILLSON, CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1988); CATHY D. MATSON & PETER S. ONUF, A UNION OF INTERESTS:
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1990); and GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). The main
documentary sources, including notably James Madison's notes from the Convention, are
found in the four volumes of THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
(Max Farrand ed., 1966).
10. A comparative study of the 1848 movements is PRISCILLA ROBERTSON, REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 (1952). Useful studies of the making of the 1848 French constitution are
PAUL BASTID, DOCTRINES ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES DE LA SECONDE RlPUBLIQUE
(1945), and JACQUES COHEN, LA PRPARATION DE LA CONSTITUTION DE 1848 (1935).
The minutes of the Constitutional Committee are published in PIERO CRAVERI, GENESI
DI UNA CONSTITUZIONE: LIBERTA E SOCIALISMO NEL DIBATITO CONSTITUZIONALE DEL
1848 IN FRANCiA 107-210, 223-302 (1985). One member of that committee wrote an
extraordinarily insightful analysis of its work. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, RECOLLECTIONS: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1848 (J.P. Mayer & A.P. Kerr eds. & George
Lawrence trans., 1987) (1893). The German constitution-making of 1848 is the subject of
FRANK EYCK, THE FRANKFURT PARLIAMENT 1848-1849 (1968). See also 2 ERNST R.
HUBER, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE (1960).
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their constitutions." The defeated German state adopted the
Weimar Constitution.
Next, the fourth wave occurred after the Second World War.
The defeated nations-Japan, Germany and Italy-adopted new
constitutions under the more or less strict tutelage of the Allied
Powers. 3
A fifth wave was connected with the breakup of the French
and British colonial empires. It began in India and Pakistan in the
1940s, but the process did not really gain momentum until the
1960s. In many cases, the new constitutions were modeled closely
on those of the former colonial powers. To name only a few examples, the constitution of the Ivory Coast was modeled on that
of the Fifth French Republic, whereas those of Ghana and Nigeria
followed the British "Westminster model."
A next wave is linked to the fall of the dictatorships in
Southern Europe in the mid-1970s. Between 1974 and 1978, Portugal, Greece, and Spain adopted new democratic constitutions.' 4
Finally, a number of former Communist countries in Eastern
and Central Europe adopted new constitutions after the fall of
communism in 1989. Although I do not have an exact count, there
must be a couple of dozen new constitutions in the region.'I know too little about the new constitutions in the ex-colonial countries to take account of them in this Essay. But I shall

11. See AGNES HEADLAM-MoRLEY, THE NEW DEMOCRATIC CONSTITrrIONS OF
EUROPE 46-48 (1929).
12. 1d. at 44; see also 5 ERNST R. HUBER, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE

1178 (1978) (chronicling events leading to the adoption of the Weimar Constitution).
13. Good studies of the making of the West German Constitution of 1949 (the only
one of the post-1945 constitutions to be examined here) include J. FORD GOLAY, THE
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1958) and PETER H. MERKL,
THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963). Transcripts of the relevant deDES
RAT:
VERHANDLUNGEN
found
in
PARLAMENTARISCHER
bates
are
HAUPTAUSSCHUSSES (1948-49).

14. For a discussion of Spain's constitution-making process, the only one of this wave
that I consider below, see BONimE-BLANC, supra note 1; JOSEP M. COLOMER, GAME
THEORY AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE SPANISH MODEL (1995); Francisco

Rubio Llorente, The Writing of the Constitution of Spain, in CONSTrrITUON MAKERS ON
CONSTrITUTION MAKING, supra note 1, at 239.
15. See generally E. EUR. CONST. REV. (reporting on the constitution-making process
in Eastern and Central Europe); RFE/RL Research Institute, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Inc., REPORT ON EASTERN EUROPE (1989-1991); RFE/RL Research Institute,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT (1991-present). I
shall refer to the Radio Free Europe publications as "RFE" followed by the date of
publication. A more synthetic exposition is offered in Elster, supra note 8.
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draw on constituent episodes from all the other waves and also on
some isolated episodes that were not part of any wave.16 Most of
my examples will be taken from the American and French assemblies of the 1780s and the East European constituent bodies of the
1990s.
My universe is limited, therefore, to Europe and North America. I shall ignore not only the recent Asian and African constitutions, but also the rich history of constitution-making in Latin
America. I simply know too little about the history, culture, and
languages of these parts of the world to be able to interpret their
constitution-making experiences with any kind of confidence.
Before I deal with the constraints, motivations, and aggregation mechanisms, let me point to a large fact that may help us
understand why constitutions occur in waves. The fact is that new
constitutions almost always are written in the wake of a crisis or
exceptional circumstance of some sort.17 There are some exceptions. The Swedish Constitution of 1974, for instance, was made
under entirely undramatic circumstances.18 The new Canadian
Constitution of 1982 may also count as a counterexample, although the context here was somewhat more tense. By and large,
however, the link between crisis and constitution-making is quite
robust.
I have identified a number of circumstances that induce constitution-making. First, there is social and economic crisis, as in the

16. These include notably the making of the French Constitution of 1958 and of the
Canadian Constitution of 1982. For the former, see JEAN-MARIE DENQUIN, 1958: LA
GENtSE DE LA VE RPUBUQUE (1988) and L'tCRITURE DE LA CONSTrUTION DE 1958
(Didier Maus et al. eds., 1992). Documentation and transcripts of relevant debates are
found in 1-3 DOCUMENTS POUR SERVIR A L'HISTOIRE DE L'LABORATION DE LA CON-

STIUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958 (Comit6 National Charg6 de la Publication des Travaux
Prdparatoires des Institutions de ]a Ve Rdpublique ed., 1987-1991). For the latter, see
notably PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (2d ed. 1993). Documentary background is provided in CANADA'S
CONSTrrUTON Acr 1982 & AMENDMENTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Anne F.

Bayefsky ed., 1989).
17. See RUSSELL, supra note 16, at 106 ("No liberal democratic state has accomplished comprehensive constitutional change outside the context of some cataclysmic situation such as revolution, world war, the withdrawal of empire, civil war, or the threat of
imminent breakup.").
18. See generally Olof Ruin, Sweden: The New Constitution (1974) and the Tradition
of Consensual Politics, in CONSTrTri=ONS IN DEMOCRATIC POITICS, supra note 5, at 309

(describing Sweden's process of constitutional reform, which included two appointed parliamentary commissions and spanned almost two decades before a new constitution was
adopted in 1974).
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making of the American Constitution of 1787 or the French Constitution of 1791."9 Let me emphasize that the making of the first
French constitution was not an effect of the French revolution, but
rather its cause: The economic crisis caused the constitution-making process, which eventually turned into a political revolution.
Second, there is revolution, as in the making of the 1830 Charter
in France or the French and German 1848 Constitutions. Third,
there is regime collapse, as in the making of the new constitutions
in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s and in Eastern Europe in
the early 1990s. Fourth, there is fear of regime collapse, as in the
making of the French Constitution of 1958, which was imposed by
de Gaulle under the shadow of a military rebellion. The making
of the 1791 Polish Constitution also illustrates this case. Fifth,
there is defeat in war, as in Germany after the First and Second
World Wars, or in Italy and Japan after the Second. Sixth, there is
reconstruction after war, as in France in 1946. Seventh, there is
the creation of a new state, as in Poland and Czechoslovakia after
the First World War. Eighth and finally, there is liberation from
colonial rule, as in the United States after 1776 and in many third
world countries after 1945.
We are now in a position to understand the phenomenon of
constitution-making waves. First, we may dismiss some of the
waves as spurious or accidental. The temporal proximity of the
American Constitution of 1787 and the French and Polish Constitutions of 1791 is just a coincidence. The same is true, I believe,
of the almost simultaneous collapses of the South European dictatorships around 1975. The other waves, however, are nonspurious.

19. With regard to France in 1789, the assertion of a crisis is a truism. The finances
of the kingdom were in a shambles because of military overcommitments. The last harvest had been disastrous, and the winter cruel. Moreover, these acute pressures emerged
against a background of chronic anomie. The hierarchies were crumbling. All classes
harbored intense resentments, either against each other or against the royal administration. Intellectual criticism was rampant. Although the direct purpose for calling the Estates General was to raise revenue, they were ineluctably transformed into a general
attack on privilege. With regard to America in 1787, the assertion of a general crisis is
more controversial. However, although the economy was prosperous, there was a widespread belief that the country was badly governed. The state legislatures, according to
this perception, acted on partisan and myopic motives, and Congress was too weak to
restrain or coordinate their behavior. Moreover, many believed that this political misbehavior was having dire economic consequences, such as the printing of paper money, the
cancellation of debts, and the confiscation of property. For explanatory purposes, the
existence of these beliefs is more important than their accuracy.
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In some cases, the constitution-making episodes came in clusters because they were triggered by the same event. Here, the
clustering is explained by the principle "similar causes, similar
effects." This argument applies to the waves of constitution-making
in the United States after 1776, in the third world after decolonization, and in numerous European countries after the First or
the Second World War.
In other cases, the triggering events occurred in a chain reaction. By this I do not mean that constitution-making in one country triggered constitution-making in another, but that the event
that caused constitution-making in one country triggered similar
events, with constitution-making consequences, in another.
The chain reaction cases can be further subdivided into two
categories. First, one triggering event can serve as a cognitive
model for another. This was the mechanism by which the outbreak
of the French Revolution of 1848 triggered many similar events in
Germany. By appealing to this mechanism we can also assert, I
think, that the 1992 breakup of the Czechoslovak federation was
triggered by the earlier breakups of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations.' What happens in such cases is that courses of action
that previously were unthinkable or appeared as mere abstract
possibilities suddenly become vivid and realistic options.
Second, what happens in one country may influence what
happens elsewhere by the mechanism of upgrading of beliefs. An
example is provided by the classical domino theory that governed
American foreign policy for many years. The idea was that if the
Americans yielded in, say, Vietnam, this would send a signal to
other governments in the region-and to the insurgency movements-about the willingness of the Americans to intervene. Much
the same idea underlies recent Russian policy in Chechnya. More
relevantly for the present purposes, the 1989-1990 Round Table
Talks in Eastern Europe illustrate the same pattern. The lack of
Soviet intervention in Poland enabled the Hungarians to upgrade

20. Some scholars who discuss the breakup of Czechoslovakia argue that the abolition of the centralizing Communist regimes combined with long-standing ethnic or national hostilities contributed to the splits. For this "similar causes, similar effects" argument,
see Eric Stein, Musings at the Grave of a Federation, in INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 2 ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS 641, 647
(Deirdre Curtin & Ton Heukels eds., 1994). I argue against this interpretation in Jon
Elster, Transition, Constitution-making and Separation in Czechoslovakia, 36 ARCHIVES
EUROPtENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE 105 (1995).
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their beliefs about the likelihood of Soviet intervention in their
country. For the Czechoslovaks, it was the Soviet nonintervention
in East Germany that made them understand that there would not
be a repetition of 1968. In addition, the Polish institution of
Round Table Talks between the regime and the opposition provided a cognitive model for all the later transitions.
II. CONSTRAINTS
So far I have tried to identify the conditions under which a
country enters the constitution-making process. I now turn to my
main topic, which is to understand the inner dynamics of that
process. My focus will be on constitution-making in constituent
assemblies, although I shall also refer to constitutions that were
more or less imposed by a single political actor.
Consider first the constraints. Although most constituent assemblies in recent times have been relatively unconstrained, there
are some important exceptions, notably the assemblies that created
the American Constitution, the French Constitution of 1791, and
the German Constitution of 1949. This part will focus on these
three episodes.
Let me first distinguish between upstream and downstream
constraints. Upstream constraints are imposed on the assembly
before it starts to deliberate. Downstream constraints are created
by the need for ratification of the document the assembly produces. As we shall see, this division is somewhat misleading, but it
serves as a useful starting point.
Constituent assemblies are rarely self-created; rather, they
have an external creator. In fact, they usually have two creators.
On the one hand, there is the institution or individual that makes
the decision to convene a constituent assembly. In the United
States in 1787, this decision was made by the Continental Congress. In France in 1789, it was made by the King. In Germany in
1949, it was made by the Western occupying powers. On the other
hand, there is the institutional mechanism that selects delegates to
the constituent assembly. In the United States and in Germany,
the delegates were selected by the state legislatures. 2 ' In Germany, the selection of delegates was subject to a constraint imposed

21. In the U.S., an exception was South Carolina, in which the legislature authorized
the governor to choose the delegates.
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by the Allied Powers, namely that their number be proportional
to the population of the states. In France in 1789, the delegates
were selected by the three estates, with the King having decided
that the Third Estate should have as many delegates as the two
other estates taken together. 22
These upstream actors or agencies will often seek to impose
constraints on the procedures of the assembly or on the substance
of the constitution. The Continental Congress instructed the Federal Convention to propose changes to the Articles of Confederation, not to propose an entirely new constitution. The delegates
from Delaware came to the Convention with instructions from the
state legislature to insist on equality of voting power for all states
in the new constitution; in fact, they had asked to be so instructed. In France, many delegates came with instructions from their
constituency to vote for an absolute veto for the King in the new
constitution and to insist on voting by estate rather than by head.
In Germany, the occupying powers insisted that the new constitution had to vest most powers in the states because they feared
that a strong federal government might give rise to a new authoritarian regime.
Downstream constraints arise from the process of ratification.
If the framers know that the document they produce will have to
be ratified by another body, knowledge of the preferences of that
body will act as a constraint on what they can propose. In the
United States, the fact that the Constitution had to be ratified by
the states meant that the framers were not free to ignore the
interests of the states. In France, the King claimed a power of
veto over the constitution-a veto he was certain to exercise unless he got a veto in the constitution. In Germany, the Allied
Powers also reserved for themselves the right to approve the constitution before it was passed on to approval by popular referendum.
We now see why the division between upstream, self-imposed,
and downstream constraints is somewhat arbitrary. Typically, the
downstream constraints are in fact imposed by the upstream authority. Another even more important difficulty is that the very
idea of external constraints is misleading in this context. Constitution-makers do not always respect the instructions from their up22. For the complex origins of this momentous decision, see EGRET, NECKER,
M ESTRE DE LOUIS XVI, supra note 9, at 233-48.
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stream creators, including instructions about downstream ratification. And a constraint that can be ignored is no constraint. At the
Federal Convention, the framers ignored the instructions from the
Continental Congress on three crucial points when they decided to
write an entirely new constitution, to seek ratification by state
conventions rather than state legislatures, and to require ratification by nine states rather than by unanimity. In France, the constituent assembly decided to ignore the instructions of their constituencies with regard to both the voting procedures and the
King's veto. In Germany, finally, the constituent assembly successfully insisted on ratification by the state legislatures rather than by
popular referendum. The German framers also managed to resist
some, although not all, of the decentralizing instructions that the
Allies had given them.
The relation between the assembly and its creators can be
summarized in two opposing slogans: "Let the kingmaker beware
of the king" versus "Let the king beware of the kingmaker." In
the three cases I have discussed, the king-the assembly-by and
large won out over the kingmaker-the upstream authorities. In
Philadelphia and Paris, this outcome was to be expected. Almost
by definition, the old regime is part of the problem that a constituent assembly is convened to solve. There would be no need to
have an assembly if the regime was not flawed. But if it is flawed,
why should the assembly respect its instructions?
The German case is more complicated. The most important
factor was that the new political climate created by the Prague
Coup of February 1948 enabled the German framers to ignore
many of the instructions of the occupying powers. They successfully argued that ratification by referendum would give a dangerous
scope for Communist propaganda. Also, they got a hearing for
their claim that an excessively decentralized Germany would be an
easy prey for Communist takeover. They were able to play on
internal division among the Allied Powers and exploit the fact that
the British wanted to be relieved quickly of the costs of occupation.

23.

GOLAY, supra note 13, at 1, 8, 17, 100, 110.
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III. DESIRES AND BELIEFS
I now consider the desires and beliefs-the motivations and
motivational assumptions-of the framers. On the one hand, the
framers themselves may be swayed by a number of more or less
respectable motivations. On the other hand, they regularly make

certain assumptions about the motivations of future voters, politicians, judges, central bankers, and other actors whose behavior is
to be regulated by the constitution.
There is no reason to expect these assumptions to mirror the
motivations of the framers themselves. The American framers, for
instance, certainly saw themselves as moved by loftier motives
than those for whom they were legislating.2 4 At the Federal Convention, a dispassionate and disinterested framer such as James
Madison consistently argued that the Constitution had to be written on the Humean assumption that "every man must be supposed
a knave."' Although he used public choice arguments,2 6 Madison's own behavior cannot be explained by public choice theory.
In discussing these motivations and assumptions, I shall distinguish between interest, passion, and reason.' Roughly speaking,
interest divides into personal interest, group interest, and institu-

24. ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 51-52 (1961).
25. DAVID HUmE,ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 42 (Eugene F. Miller

ed., 1987) (1777). For the influence of Hume on the American framers, see MORTON G.
WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 13-22 (1987).
26. For some examples, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 9, at 109, 114, 123.
27. It is very common to oppose these to each other in a pairwise fashion. David
Hume, when addressing the relation between passion and reason, argued that the latter
was and ought only to be the slave of the former. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HU-

MAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1739-1740). Roughly speaking, he
meant that there could be no rational deliberation about ends, only about means. Albert
Hirschman has considered the changing attitudes towards passions and interests in the
eighteenth century, arguing that the dominance of interest over passion in a commercial
society constituted a "political argument[] for capitalism before its triumph." ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS at iii
(1977). In many discussions of the
debates at the Federal Convention, reason and interest are believed to exhaust the motives of the framers. See JILLSON, supra note 9, at 193-94 (citing Madison, Alexander
Hamilton, and de Tocqueville to the same effect); see also Jack N. Rakove, The Great
Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Constitution Making, 44 WM. & MARY
Q. 424 (1987). Below, I cite a passage from La Bruyhre in which all three motivations
are considered together. For a discussion of this trio of motives among the American
founders, see WHITE, supra note 25, at 102-12. For a discussion in a different constitutional setting, see REG WHITAKER, Reason, Passion and Interest: Pierre Trudeau's Eternal
Liberal Triangle, in A SOVEREIGN IDEA 132 (1992).
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tional interest. Passion divides into sudden or impulsive passions
and standing or permanent ones. Reason, finally, is characterized
by an impartial concern for the public good or for individual
rights. Let me now consider these motivations in more detail.
A. Interest
1. Personal Interest. The personal interest of constitutionmakers in specific constitutional clauses is a relatively marginal
factor, although it does play a certain role in some cases. While
few today would defend the Beard thesis that the framers at the
Federal Convention were motivated mainly by their own economic
interests,' statistical analysis of the vote patterns suggests that
these interests have some explanatory power.29 In the making of
the recent Romanian and Bulgarian constitutions, several provisions apparently owe their origin to a desire of the former
Communists to escape criminal prosecution."
The most blatant example I know is found in the making of
the Czech Constitution of 1992. The decision by the Czech Parliament to create a bicameral parliament in the new constitution
was widely seen as an incentive offered to the Czech deputies in
the Federal Assembly to pass a constitutional law abolishing the
federation in exchange for a place in the new Senate.3 It belongs
to the story that afterwards the Czech deputies reneged on their
promise in order to keep their rivals out of the political limelight.
Three years after the adoption of the constitution, elections to the
Senate have not taken place or been scheduled. As another example of self-serving constitution-making, one may cite the unusually
strong immunity that the Czech framers granted themselves, requiring the consent of parliament before criminal prosecution of

28. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1986).
29. Robert A. McGuire, Constitution Making: A Rational Choice Model of the Federal Convention of 1787, 32 AM. J. POL SCI. 483, 484 (1988).
30. In the Romanian case, this statement is conjectural and based on indirect evidence only. For the Bulgarian case, see Kjell Engelbrekt, Constitution Adopted, Elections

Set, RFE Aug. 16, 1991, at 1, 2.
31. See Jiri Pehe, The Waning Popularity of the Czech Parliament, RFE Nov. 12,
1993, at 9; see also Vojtech Cepl & David Franklin, Senate, Anyone?, E. EUR. CONST.
REV., Spring 1993, at 58, 60 (arguing that even though the decision to create a bicameral
parliament was based on self-interest, it had the effect of ensuring an indissoluble, unicameral parliament that has provided governmental stability).
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deputies on any matter whatsoever. In essence, they used the
constitution to get rid of traffic penalties. 2
2. Group Interest. Group interest is a much more important
factor in the constitution-making process. At the Federal Convention, the interests of the states were a crucial determinant of the
outcome. These interests were reflected both in substantive and
procedural provisions of the Constitution. Substantively, the Constitution embodies a compromise between the interests of the slave
states and those of the trading states.33 Procedurally, the small
states successfully insisted on equality of voting power for all
states in the Senate. 34
In the French Assembly of 1789, the interests of the estates
were an important factor in the initial procedural debates. The
nobility and the clergy wanted the assembly to vote by estate,
which would enable them to outvote the Third Estate. The Third
Estate insisted on voting by head, which would enable them, with
the help of a few renegades, to outvote the other two estates. The
matter was resolved in favor the Third Estate.
In modem constituent assemblies, the interests of political
parties are often decisive in shaping electoral laws and various
parts of the machinery of government. Typically, large parties
prefer majority voting in single-member districts, whereas smaller
parties insist on proportional elections. The making of several
post-Communist constitutions in Eastern Europe illustrates this
idea. In the immediate aftermath of 1989, for instance, the small
Communist or ex-Communist parties in Poland and Czechoslovakia
insisted on proportional elections. Large parties with a reasonable
chance of forming the government may also insist on a constructive vote of no confidence, which strengthens the position of government vis-h-vis parliament. The making of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 illustrates this point.35 Parties with a strong presiden-

32. Jan Sokol, Discussions in Prague, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: DISCUSSIONS IN WARSAW, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, BRATISLAVA 92, 93 (Irena

Grudzinska-Gross ed., 1994).
33. See WiLLnAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 89-102 (1986);
see also Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant
with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 188 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).

34.
35.

Rakove, supra note 27, at 424.
BONIME-BLANC, supra note 1, at 77.
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tial candidate tend to insist on a strong presidency, whereas other
parties try to reduce the power of that office. The making of the
Polish Constitution of 1921 illustrates that connection. 6
In federally organized states such as Germany, Canada, or the
former Czechoslovakia, the interests of the states are invariably a
key factor. As was the case at the Federal Convention, the smaller
states argue for equal representation in the federal government,
and the larger states for proportionality. In Czechoslovakia, for
instance, Slovakia, with one-third of the population, managed to
ensure that half of the judges of the constitutional court would be
Slovaks and that the chairmanship of the central bank would rotate annually between a Czech and a Slovak.
Connections of this kind are commonplaces of political life,
and the bread and butter of political scientists. They are complicated, however, by another basic fact of political life: Even when
groups act to promote their interest, they tend to argue publicly in
terms of impartial values.37 When large parties argue for majority
voting, they do not refer to the interests of large parties but to
the interest of the country in having a stable government. Conversely, small parties arguing for proportional elections do not
refer to the interests of small parties but to the values of democracy and broad representation. Parties with a strong presidential
candidate regularly argue in terms of the country's need for a
strong executive. Other parties refer instead to the dangers of a
strong executive. Both small and large states appeal to the impartial value of equality-equal influence of states in the former case,
and equal influence of voters in the latter.38
A caveat is necessary, however. Although it is true that selfserving arguments tend to dress themselves in public-interest garbs,
the converse argument-that all impartial argument is nothing but
self-interest in disguise-is invalid. In some cases, the conclusion is
demonstrably false. I give examples later. More generally, the re-

36. See Jon Elster, Bargaining Over the Presidency, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall
1993/Winter 1994, at 95, 95.
37. For an argument why a public setting induces public-regarding glosses on private
deals, see Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest-Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
38. Thus, at the Convention, John Dickinson argued that any scheme that would give
some states no representation in the Senate would be "unfair." 1 THE REcORDS OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 9, at 159. Madison argued that any deviation
from proportional representation was "unjust." Id. at 151.
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ductionist claim is internally incoherent. If nobody was ever
moved by the public interest, nobody would have anything to gain
by appealing to it. Self-serving appeals to the public interest are
parasitic on genuine appeals.39
3. Institutional Interest. Institutional interest in the constitution-making process operates when a body that participates in
that process writes an important role for itself into the constitution.4 We can observe this factor at work in many cases, as
in the making of the Polish Constitution of 1921 or the French
Constitution of 1946. In both cases, the parliament that wrote the
constitution did its best to reduce the role of the executive and to
promote the role of parliament. I conjecture that institutional
interest has also been the most important factor in the making of
the post-1980 constitutions in Eastern Europe. Let me briefly
sketch four implications of that hypothesis and see how well they
are verified.
A first implication is that constituent assemblies that also
serve as ordinary legislatures will give preponderant importance to
the legislative branch at the expense of the executive-president
and cabinet-and the judiciary. In Eastern Europe, this implication
is relatively well confirmed. All the constituent assemblies were
also ordinary legislatures. Except in Poland, the presidents are not
strong. That exception does not, however, count as evidence
against the hypothesis, as the presidency in that country was an
artifact of the Round Table Talks rather than the creation of a
democratic assembly. Except for Hungary, which adopted the constructive vote of no confidence, no country has adopted provisions
that would strengthen the position of the executive vis-h-vis parliament.41 It counts against the hypothesis, however, that the consti-

39.

Cf ELSTER, supra note 3, at 125 (discussing the analogous relationship between

social norms and self-interest).

40. If one believes, as I do, in methodological individualism, talk about group interest and institutional interest can never be more than shorthand for individuals' motivations. If members of a parliamentary caucus, for instance, do not follow the party line,
they may fail to get renominated or reelected, or suffer financial sanctions. In other cases, legislators seem to identify with the institution to which they belong. Independent of
reelection, they tend to feel pride in their institution because of a need for cognitive

consonance ("This must be an important institution since I am a member of it") or
through socialization.

41. In the Romanian Constitution, however, there is a provision (Art. 113) that allows the executive to engage its responsibility on a law, so that it is automatically passed
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tutional courts are quite strong, except for Poland and Romania,
where their decisions can be overruled by parliament with a twothirds majority (Romania) or even a simple majority (Poland).42
A second implication is that unicameral and bicameral constituent assemblies will tend to create, respectively, unicameral and
bicameral constitutions-a prediction that is largely born out.
Bicameral assemblies in Poland and Romania created bicameral
constitutions; unicameral assemblies in Hungary, Slovakia, and
Bulgaria created unicameral constitutions. The only exception to
the pattern is the Czech Republic, where, as indicated earlier, a
unicameral assembly created a bicameral constitution as an incentive for the Czech deputies to the upper house of the Federal
Assembly to vote for the dissolution of the federation.
A third implication is that to the extent that the president is
involved in the constitution-making process, he will tend to promote a strong presidency. Here, the distinction between personal
and institutional interests may be a tenuous one. Yet it appears to
me that Walesa and Havel, in their efforts to strengthen the presidency, have not simply been out to enhance their own power.
Rather, I believe that from their vantage point the advantages of
a strong presidency, which can prevent chaos and ensure efficiency
in the difficult transition period, have seemed obvious and overwhelming.
A final implication is that constitution-making parliaments will
give themselves large powers to amend the constitution. In particular, their institutional interest would not recommend that changes
in the constitution be submitted to referendum or be adopted by
two successive parliaments. With the exception of Romania, where
approval by referendum is mandatory, this implication is confirmed. The importance of the Romanian exception is attenuated
by the fact that the deputies can change the constitution by the

unless parliament votes a motion of no confidence. This provision is very similar to Art.
49(3) of the French Constitution of 1958. Although it was supposed to be used only
exceptionally, see Comit6 Consultif Constitutionnel (Aug. 12, 1958), in 2 DOCuMENTS
POUR SERVIR A L'HISTOIRE DE L'tLABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE

1958, supra note 16, at 367, 505-06, Art. 49(3) has been an extremely efficient tool in

the hands of successive governments. The Romanian provision has not had a similar
importance.
42. Although the statutory law regulating the Polish court says that a two-thirds
majority is needed, that statute itself can be changed by simple majority.
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"backdoor" procedure of overruling decisions by the constitutional
court.
By and large, therefore, the hypothesis that constitution-makers are motivated by institutional interest fares quite well in Eastern Europe. Whereas group interest has strong explanatory power
with regard to electoral laws, institutional interest is a stronger
determinant of the machinery of government. Institutional interest
fails, however, to explain the creation of strong constitutional
courts, an institution that was nowhere represented in the constitution-making process and that nevertheless did quite well out of it.
Along another dimension, the hypotheses do less well in Hungary
than in the other countries. By adopting the constructive vote of
no confidence and creating a strong constitutional court, the Hungarian constitution-makers abdicated some of their most important
powers. It is possible, though, that they did not intend or foresee
that the court would become as strong as it has turned out to
be.43
B. Passion
I now turn to the role of passions-sudden or permanent-in
constitution-making. Let me first digress for a moment from the
motives of the framers to consider the motives of the framed, if I
may use that expression to designate the actors whose behavior is
to be regulated by the constitution. From a traditional view, a key
role of the constitution is to prevent the framed from acting on
sudden, unconsidered impulses: "Constitutions are chains with
which men bind themselves in their sane moments that they may
not die by a suicidal hand in the day of their frenzy."' This restraining function is achieved partly by built-in delays in the ma-

43. The Hungarian constitutional court has been called the strongest in the world.
See Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary's Transition from Communism to
Democracy: The Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of
Property Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L.REv. 41.
44. JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS 5 (1991) (quoting John Potter Stockton
in debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871). On the general theme of self-binding,
see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS Ch. II (1979) and Stephen Holmes,
Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). On the theme of constitutional self-binding,
see Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35,
35-45 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992). For a discussion of the putative
paradoxes involved in self-binding, see PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT 1-16 (1990).
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chinery of government, such as bicameralism and suspensive veto,
and partly by time-consuming amendment procedures.
Similarly, it has been argued that the constitution should
protect ethnic or religious minorities from oppression by majorities
that are subject to permanent passions and prejudice. As Cass
Sunstein writes, "Constitutional provisions should be designed to
work against precisely those aspects of a country's culture and
tradition that are likely to produce most harm through that
country's ordinary political processes."4 5 A bill of rights is the
most prominent instrument for ensuring that protection. Another
mechanism is to reserve some seats in parliament for minority
groups.
It would indeed be a good thing if constitutions could serve
these two functions. They will do so, however, only if the conditions of the framers are sufficiently different from those of the
framed. But consider the analogy that constitutions are chains
imposed by Peter when sober on Peter when drunk.' If constitutions are typically written in times of crisis, it is not obvious that
the framers will be particularly sober. The French constitutionmakers of 1791, for instance, were not famous for their sobriety,
and the document they produced, which eschews bicameralism as
well as judicial review, contains few devices for restraining majorities that are swept by passion.
Similarly, the framers will typically be subject to the same
standing passions and prejudices as the framed. As observed by
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "[A]dvocates of commitment... do not consider the political process by which such
commitments are established."'47 In Bulgaria, for instance, one
might wish for the constitution to protect the rights of the Muslim,
Turkish-speaking minority against oppression by ethnic Bulgarians.
The fact is, however, that the latter exploited their control of the
constitution-making process in 1990-1991 to adopt some of the
most illiberal provisions in the new East European constitutions.4

45. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism, Prosperity, Democracy: Transition in Eastern
Europe, in 2 CONST. POL. ECON. 371, 385 (1991).
46. Holmes, supra note 44, at 196.
47. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic Growth,
J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1993, at 51, 66.
48. Standing passions can be overcome, though, if the constitution is written under
foreign supervision or by a small and enlightened minority within the country. The illiberal provisions in the first draft of the recent Romanian Constitution were eliminated
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There is one particular passion that has, somewhat surprisingly, played a considerable role in constitution-making. This is vanity
or self-love, amour-propre, which many moralists from La Rochefoucauld onwards have considered the most powerful human emotion. Not surprisingly, we find it both in the framers and in the
assumptions they make about the framed.
Consider first vanity, or rather fear of the effects of vanity, in
the framers. At the Federal Convention, the delegates decided at
the outset to adopt a rule of secrecy because they understood
themselves well enough to know that if they had once adopted a
position in public, vanity might keep them from changing their
mind later. As Madison said later, "Had the members committed
themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed
consistency required them to maintain their ground, whereas by
secret discussion no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions
any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and
was open to the force of argument., 49 I shall argue, however,
that secrecy may also tend to move the proceedings away from
discussion and towards threat-based bargaining.
Consider next vanity in the framed. At the first French Assembly, many speakers asserted that one should never place an
agent in a situation in which his vanity might lead him to act
against the public interest. The prosecutor also should not serve as
judge because if the functions are combined, the amour-propre of
the magistrate might bias him towards the guilt of the accused. 0
A merely suspensive veto for the king would not have the intended effect of making the assembly reconsider its decision because
its amour-proprewould prevent it from backing down."1
C. Reason
Another French moralist, La Bruy~re, wrote that "[n]othing is
easier for passion than to overcome reason: its great triumph is to
win out over interest."'5 2 Sometimes, however, reason can win out
after strong pressure from the Council of Europe. And it is at least arguable that the
standing passion for levelling equality among the Americans was overcome by the elitist
Constitution of 1787.
49. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 9, at 479.
50. See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 9, at 443.
51. See 9 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 9, at 111.
52.

La Bruybre, Caracteres, in 1 COLLECTION DES MEILLEURS AUTEURS

(Librarie de la Bibliothque Nationale, 1899) (translation by author).

3, 75
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over passion as well as interest. In fact, we just saw an example.
When the framers at the Federal Convention decided to proceed
behind closed doors, it was because their reason told them that
otherwise they might yield to passion. They did not conquer passion, perhaps, but preempted it.
Similarly, when the French delegates of 1789 adopted
Robespierre's proposal for a law that would render them ineligible
to the first ordinary legislature, it was because they wanted to
shield themselves from institutional interest. More generally, the
exceptions that I noted earlier about the tendency for East European constituent parliaments to favor parliament in the constitution can also be seen as expressions of impartial, disinterested
motivations.
Let me give another example of such counter-interested behavior. Immediately after the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel and his advisors from Civil Forum undertook to
write the electoral law for the elections to the constituent assembly. Havel strongly favored the majority system because it would
allow the voters to select individuals rather than parties. The majority system would also have allowed Civil Forum to sweep the
elections, as Solidarity had done in Poland in June 1989. For
Havel and his group, however, the latter fact counted against the
majority system rather than for it. They deliberately pulled their
punches and adopted a proportional mode of election because
they wanted a broad representation of all political tendencies,
including the Communists, in the first parliament. As one of
Havel's close collaborators told me, "This decision will be seen
either as the glory or the weakness of the November revolution:
we were winners that accepted a degree of self-limitation."
From the Federal Convention, I can cite another discussion
that pits interest against reason. Elbridge Gerry had proposed to
"limit the number of new States to be admitted into the Union, in
such a manner, that they should never be able to outnumber the
Atlantic States."53 In his reply, Roger Sherman relied on personal
interest to overcome group interest. "We are providing," he said,
"for our posterity, for our children and our grand Children, who
would be as likely to be citizens of new Western States as of the
old States. '
53.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 9, at 3.

54. Id A similar argument was offered by George Mason in a different context:
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Neither argument should be confused with genuine appeals to
impartiality, as in Mason's argument for granting new states equal
status: "Strong objections have been drawn," he said, "from the
danger to the Atlantic interests from new Western states." He
went on to say, however, that the delegates ought not "to sacrifice
what we know to be right in itself, lest it should prove favorable
to States which are not yet in existence. If the Western States are
to be admitted into the Union as they arise, they must," he insisted, "be treated as equals, and subjected to no degrading discrimination."'5 5 This argument does not rest on the long-term interests
of family lines, but on a conception of intrinsic fairness.
IV. AGGREGATION, TRANSFORMATION, AND MISREPRESENTATION OF PREFERENCES

Given their motivations and cognitive assumptions, constitutional framers form preferences regarding the various institutional
arrangements that are proposed. In this part, I discuss how these
preferences come together, as it were, to produce a collective
decision.
It is not simply a question of aggregating given preferences by
a given procedure. For one thing, the procedure has itself to be
chosen by the delegates. In France in 1789, as I said, the delegates
had to choose between voting by estate and voting by head. In
Philadelphia, they had to choose between equal voting power for
all states at the Convention and giving more votes to the heavily
populated states.56 In the first case, they adopted the principle

We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often
wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of
humanity & policy, considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but
certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights
and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 9, at 49.
55. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 9, at 578,
579.
56. Actually, the latter proposal was only fleetingly entertained. Although the Pennsylvanians wanted to refuse the smaller states an equal vote, their proposal was never
put on the table. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 9, at 10 n.4. When a committee was formed to forge a compromise on the upper
house, James Wilson "objected to the Committee because it would decide according to
that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side," but to no avail. Id. at 515.
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"one man, one vote"; in the second, "one group, one vote."
In most other assemblies, it is usually taken for granted that
decisions will be reached by a simple majority of the delegates.
Yet some assemblies have decided from the beginning to aim at
something close to consensus. This was the case, for instance, in
the making of the 1949 German Constitution and the 1978 Spanish
Constitution. To avoid confrontation and achieve consensus, the
Spanish framers early on made a number of important procedural
decisions. They successfully imposed secrecy on the committee
proceedings and decided that the parties should not be allowed to
present whole constitutional drafts, only drafts of individual provisionsO
For another thing, we cannot assume that delegates simply
express given preferences or follow instructions from their constituencies. As I mentioned above, the delegates to the Federal Convention imposed secrecy on the debates to make it easier for them
to change their minds through discussion. In the first French Assembly, imperative mandates were rejected for the same reason. In
the best-known statement of this view, Abbe Siey;s argued that
the "voeu national," the desire of the nation, could not be determined by consulting the cahiers of complaints and wishes that the
delegates had brought with them to Versailles. Bound mandates,
similarly, could not be viewed as expressions of the national will.
In a democracy (a term that was used pejoratively at the time), he
said, people form their opinions at home and then bring them to
the voting booth. If no majority emerges, they go back home to
reconsider their views, once again isolated from each other. This
procedure for forming a common will, he claimed, is absurd because it lacks the element of deliberation and discussion: "It is not
a question of a democratic election, but of proposing, listening,
concerting, changing one's opinion, in order to form in common a
common will.""
Generally speaking, preferences can undergo two different
kinds of changes before they enter as inputs to the aggregation
process. First, as I have said, there is transformationof preferences
through discussion. People may change their derived preferences

57. Jose Pedro Pdrez-Llorea, Commentary, in CONSTrUTION MAKERS ON CONSTTUION MAKING, supra note 1, at 266, 271-72 (commenting on Rubio Llorente, supra note
14).
58. 8 ARCHIVEs PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 9, at 595 (translation by author).
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when they get new information about ends-means relationships.
Less frequently, perhaps, they may change their fundamental preferences as a result of normative argument. Second, there is the
possibility of misrepresentation of preferences. For a number of
reasons, delegates may, in their speeches and votes, express preferences other than those they actually have.
The scope for both kinds of change depends on whether the
framers debate publicly or behind closed doors. I have already
indicated that secrecy of the debates is likely to have two consequences. On the one hand, it will tend to shift the center of gravity from impartial discussion to interest-based bargaining. In private, there is less need to present one's proposal as aimed at
promoting the public good. On the other hand, secrecy tends to
improve the quality of whatever discussion does take place because it allows framers to change their mind when persuaded of
the truth of an opponent's view. Conversely, while public debate
drives out any appearance of bargaining, it also encourages stubbornness, overbidding, and grandstanding in ways that are incompatible with genuine discussion. Rather than fostering transformation of preferences, the public setting encourages their misrepresentation.
The Federal Convention and the first French Assembly are
polar cases in this respect. In Madison's notes from the Convention, we come across some exceptionally fine instances of rational
discussion and some exceptionally hard bargains. In the records of
the French Assembly we find neither. The speakers argue without
exception in terms of the public interest. We know from other
evidence, however, that because of publicity-generated fear of
sanctions, many of the constituants spoke and voted against their
convictions. 59 The radical delegates insisted on voting by roll call,
a procedure that enabled members or spectators to identify those
who opposed radical measures and to circulate lists with their
names in Paris. The defeat of bicameralism and of an absolute
veto for the King, in particular, owed much to the fear generated
by this publicity.'
A very different source of misrepresentation is directly linked
to the process of aggregation. When the framers of a constitution
vote on the various issues that are before them, vote-trading oc-

59.

EGRET, LA RMVOLUTION DES NOTABLES, supra note 9, at 120.

60. Id. at 154.
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curs on a regular basis. A delegate may vote against his true preferences on an issue he cares little about, but that matters very
much to another delegate, in exchange for a similar concession by
the other.
In the first French Assembly, a famous piece of logrolling
took place in the last days of August 1789 when the Assembly
was about to debate the basic institutions of the state.61 In three
meetings between Mounier on the one hand and the "triumvirate"
of Barnave, Duport, and Alexandre Lameth on the other, the
three came up with the following proposal: They would offer
Mounier both an absolute veto for the King and bicameralism if
he in return would accept that the King give up his right to dissolve the assembly, that the upper chamber would have a suspensive veto only, and that there would be periodical conventions for
the revision of the constitution.62 Mounier refused outright.63
According to his own account, he did not think it right to make
concessions on a matter of principle.' He may also have been in
doubt about the ability of the three to deliver on their promise.
According to later historians, he refused because he was so confident that the Assembly was on his side that no concessions were
needed.' As I just mentioned, he was wrong.
Note that logrolling of this sort is difficult if the constituent
assembly is deeply polarized around one issue. The break-up of
Czechoslovakia may be understood in this perspective. Here the
constitution-making process was polarized around the problem of
the federation. No other issues were important enough for logrolling to be possible. Moreover, it is arguable that separation was the
only compromise solution, being the second-best option of both
sides.
The making of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 involved
logrolling on a large scale, with the main issues being the role of
the Church, the autonomy of the provinces, and socioeconomic
policy. Because of the presence of several issues that could be

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.at 139.
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 140.
Jean-Joseph Mounier, Exposd de ma Conduite dans l'Assemblde Nationale, in
ORATEURS DE LA RMVOLUT[ON FRANCQAISE: LES CONSrTUANTS, supra note 9, at 908,
933.
65. A. Mathiez, Etude Critique sur les Journdes des 5 & 6 Octobre 1789, 67 REVUE
HISTORiQUE 241, 267 (1898).
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traded off against each other, it was possible to reach a high degree of consensus.6 Earlier constitution-making efforts in Spain
had been more polarized. The 1931 Spanish Constitution, for instance, was adopted by a small majority that imposed dogmatic,
leftist, and secular principles on their opponents.
Aggregation by voting is inherently vulnerable to cycling.
William Riker demonstrated the existence of a cycle at the Federal Convention in the matter of the Presidency, with the cycling
options being election by Congress with the concurrence of both
Houses, election of the President by electors chosen by the states
in proportion to their population, and election by a joint session
of the House and the Senate. According to Riker, the revelation
of this cycle prevented the second alternative from being adopted,
and prepared the way for the final compromise in which the small
states got to choose a more-than-proportional number of electors. 67

Finally, I shall consider the role of threat-based bargaining as
a mechanism of aggregation. Vote trading may of course also be
considered in this perspective, with the threat being that of withholding one's vote on an issue of vital importance to the opponent. But what I have in mind here is bargaining based on resources that are not created by the political system, but that exist
independently of the assembly itself. These include foreign powers,
police, military forces, terrorism, command over crowds, and electoral prospects. Because constitutions tend to be made in a crisis,
these extra-political resources often play a prominent role. Time
and the ability to hold out is also an important resource that
confers credibility on threats in such cases.
Many constitution-making processes have been suspended in
fields of extra-political forces. I shall illustrate with examples from
the two eighteenth-century assemblies, and then very briefly mention some more recent cases.
At the Federal Convention, we find several references to
extra-political forces, notably in the debates over the representation of the small states in the Senate. On June 30, Gunning Bed-
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ford, Jr. asserted that "[tihe Large States dare not dissolve the
confederation. If they do the small ones will find some foreign ally
of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand
and do them justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or
alarm. It was a natural consequence which ought to be avoided by
[e]nlarging the federal powers not annihilating the federal sys,6
tem. 8
On July 5, Gouverneur Morris counterattacked:
Let us suppose that the larger States shall agree; and that the
smaller refuse: and let us trace the consequences. The opponents
of the system in the smaller States will no doubt make a party
and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest, of kindred & of
common habits which connect them with the other States will be
too strong to be easily broken. In N. Jersey particularly he was
sure a great many would follow the sentiments of Pena. & N.
York. This Country must be united. If persuasion does not unite
it, the sword will. He begged that this consideration might have
its due weight. The scenes of horror attending civil commotion
can not be described, and the conclusion of them will be worse
than the term of their continuance. The stronger party will then
make traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter will
finish the work of the sword. How far foreign powers would be
ready to take part in the confusions he would not say. Threats
that they will be invited have it seems been thrown out.69
Later, both sides retreated by rephrasing their threats as warnings. " This is a widely observed stratagem. In the Polish Round
Table Talks in 1989, for instance, the government negotiators were
7

68.
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careful not to brandish the threat of Soviet intervention. Instead,
they warned the Solidarity negotatiors that if liberalization went
too far, the Soviets were likely to intervene, which was against the
wishes of both sides.
In France in 1789, the field of force was defined by the royal
troops in the vicinity of Versailles and the crowds in Paris. When
in the first days of July the King reinforced the presence of troops
near Versailles, the implied threat to the assembly escaped no one.
Mirabeau's replies to the King's challenge were, however, subject
to the threat-warning ambiguity. In his first speech on the subject,
he spoke in quite general terms: "How could the people not become upset when their only remaining hope [i.e., the assembly] is
in danger?,' In his second speech, he became more specific: The
troops "may forget that they are soldiers by contract, and remember that by nature they are men."'72 Furthermore, the assembly
cannot even trust itself to act responsibly: "Passionate movements
are contagious: we are only men, our fear of appearing to be weak
may carry us too far in the opposite direction."'
In his brief intervention in the same debate, Siey~s mentioned
that in all deliberative assemblies, notably in the Estates of
Brittany, the Assembly refused to deliberate if troops were located
closer than twenty-five miles from where it was sitting.74 When
the Assembly asked for the removal of the troops, however, the
King in his response pretended that they had been brought to
control Paris rather than to terrorize the Assembly.75 If the Assembly took objection to the presence of troops in the vicinity of
Paris, he would be perfectly happy to move the Assembly to Noyon or Soisson, and to move himself to Compifgne so as to facilitate communication between them. However, the Assembly could
not accept a proposal that would deprive them of the threat potential of Paris. It was decided to send a delegation to the King,
asking him to recall the troops "whose presence adds to the des-

71. 8 ARcHIvEs PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 9, at 209 (translation by author).
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peration of the people."'76 If the King agreed, the Assembly
would send a delegation to Paris "to tell the good news and contribute to a return of order."' There was no need to say what
they would do if he failed to accommodate them. The next day
the Bastille fell, and the King agreed to send the troops away.
The same forces-the troops and the crowds-were at work in
Paris in 1848. In Paris in 1958, the prospect of military rebellion
was a major factor enabling de Gaulle to impose his constitution.
In Frankfurt in 1848, the constitution-making process was punctuated by the murder of a prominent right-wing member of the
assembly. In Weimar in 1919, revolutionary workers and the victorious enemy were both instrumental in shaping the constitution. In
Bonn in 1949, the German framers cleverly used the Communist
scare in their bargaining with the Western occupying powers. In
Spain in 1978, the constitution-making took place in an atmosphere heavily influenced by the Francoist army and Basque terrorists. In Eastern Europe, the quasi-constitutional Round Table
Talks were suspended between threats or warnings of Soviet intervention on the one hand, and the potential for mass demonstrations by the workers on the other.
We can draw on game theory and bargaining theory to model
these influences explicitly" as long as we remain conscious of the
limitations of that approach. In situations like those I just invoked,
people do not always act rationally. Fear, anger, and enthusiasm
often get the better of them. Nor can they easily estimate the
likelihood of the various contingencies. In these situations, constitution-making has more of the opaqueness of battle than the calculability of parliamentary proceedings. Formal theory helps us to
make more precise sense of some of the factors we can identify,
but it hardly allows for a complete explanation.
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CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by underlining two basic paradoxes of constitution-making and then drawing some normative implications of
the analysis. The first paradox arises from the fact that the task of
constitution-making generally emerges in conditions that are likely
to work against good constitution-making. Being written for the
indefinite future, constitutions ought to be adopted in maximally
calm and undisturbed conditions. Also, the intrinsic importance of
constitution-making requires that procedures be based on rational,
impartial argument. In ordinary legislatures, logrolling and horsetrading may ensure that all groups realize some of their most
strongly held goals. Constitution-makers, however, legislate mainly
for future generations, which have no representatives in the constituent assembly. It is part of their task to look beyond their own
horizon and their own interests. At the same time, the call for a
new constitution usually arises in turbulent circumstances, which
tend to foster passion rather than reason. Also, the external circumstances of constitution-making invite procedures based on
threat-based bargaining. Marx said that "mankind always sets itself
only such tasks as it can solve."79 In constitution-making, by contrast, it seems that the task is set only under conditions that work
against a good solution.
The second paradox stems from the fact that the public will to
make major constitutional change is unlikely to be present unless a
crisis is impending. Suppose, for example, that constitutional
change is put on the agenda even though there are no dramatic
external circumstances. In that case, no solution may be found at
all. As Peter Russell writes, "A country must have a sense that its
back is to the wall for its leaders and its people to have the will
to accommodate their differences."' In Canada after 1982 and in
Poland after 1992, we can observe how constitution-making failed
to get off the ground because there was no urgent need to reshape
the basic institutions. It is an axiom of bargaining theory that "[i]f
it did not matter when people agreed, it would not matter whether
or not they agreed at all."'" If people find themselves with all the

79. KARL MARX, Preface to A Critique of Political Economy, in KARL MARX: A
READER 187, 187 (Jon Elster ed., 1986).
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time they need to find a good solution, no solution at all may
emerge.
I conclude with some comments on the normative implications
that may be drawn from the arguments made above. The most
important is perhaps that to reduce the scope for institutional
interest, constitutions ought to be written by specially convened
assemblies and not by bodies that also serve as ordinary legislatures. Nor should the legislatures be given a central place in the
process of ratification. In both these respects, the Federal Convention can serve as a model. Another implication is that the
process ought to contain both elements of secrecy (committee
discussion) and of publicity (plenary assembly discussions). With
total secrecy, partisan interests and logrolling come to the forefront, whereas full publicity encourages grandstanding and rhetorical overbidding. At the Federal Convention, there was too little
publicity; in the French Assembly of 1789, too much. The making
of the 1978 Spanish Constitution may have come closer to the
optimal balance.'
More tentatively, I also suggest the following recommendations: (1) Elections to the constituent assembly ought to follow the
proportional system rather than the majority system. Whatever the
advantages of the majority system in creating ordinary legislatures,
a constituent assembly ought to be broadly representative.8 (2)
The constituent assembly ought to be unicameral, not bicameral.
Whatever the arguments for having bicameralism in ordinary legislatures, they do not apply to the constituent assembly. (3) To
reduce the scope for threats and attempts to influence the deliberations by mass demonstrations, the assembly should not convene in
the capital of the country or in a major city; nor should armed
forces be allowed to sojourn in the vicinity of the assembly. (4)
The role of experts should be kept to a minimum because solutions tend to be more stable if dictated by political rather than
technical considerations. Lawyers will tend to resist the technically
flawed and deliberately ambiguous formulations that may be necessary to achieve consensus. (5) The assembly should work with a
time limit, so that no group can use delaying tactics to get its way.
(6) If delays are affordable, the constitution should not come into
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effect until some time after it has been adopted to reduce the
impact of short-term and partisan motives. As new constitutions
usually are called for in times of crises, however, delays will rarely
be affordable. Again, we encounter the paradox that the need for
constitution-making tends to emerge under conditions that systematically work against the impartial and far-sighted reasoning for
which the task calls.

